

The Role of Energy Investments in the Middle East Policy of Russia

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Abstract

This study examines Russia's growing influence in the Middle East. It is obvious that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation, which at that time had no specific policy in the Middle East, moved away from the region. Russia, which was gradually losing the positions won in the Soviet period, began to return to the region with Putin in power. Putin's first plans were to maintain the previous achievements, and only then to become an important player in the Middle East. It became more obvious when the Arab spring began. The energy and economic investments of Russia in the region are considered in a broad context in our study. The customs data of the Russian Federation, agreements achieved between companies and published scientific articles are analyzed in this paper. Our goal is to present the growing role of the Russian Federation in the Middle East using data and explore the role of economic and energy investments in this process.

Keywords: Russia, Middle East, Energy, Economic, Security

I. INTRODUCTION

The importance of the Middle East in the new world order after the Second World War was manifested in the concentration of western states in the region. Russia's interest in the Middle East has increased due to the crisis in the Suez channel. By the 1970s, the Middle East policy of the Soviet Union had suffered some difficulties. One of them is the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The crisis during this period was a unifying factor for the Arab countries. The US approach to the crisis has been condemned by the countries of the Middle East. The USSR has been accused of insufficient support of these countries. It was supposed that Soviet foreign policy has insufficient influence on Israel and therefore only Washington can influence it. The introduction of Soviet troops in Afghanistan was another reason for the crisis in these years. The war, which began in 1979, was completed in 1989. In this period the fight against terrorism and USA power were strengthening what was directed against the USSR. Subsequently, the Russian Federation became the successor of the Soviet Union. The President Yeltsin failed to achieve a consistent policy in the region that manifested in significant felling arms sales in the Middle East. In this connection financial assistance to allies in the region decreased significantly [1]. As a part of the transition to a unipolar world led by the United States, Russia's position after the collapse of the socialist system has weakened significantly. In 1990,

during the period of decreasing oil production in Russia, importers of gas and oil went to the Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, where political stability was guaranteed by the United States [2].

I.I. The main changes in Russia's Middle East policy during Putin's reign

Undeveloped relations with the Middle East after the collapse of the Soviet Union are regarded as a significant loss. After the 2000s, Russia's policy towards the Middle East began to be viewed from a new perspective. At that time, the west countries have planned to create a "new Middle East within the new world order". Russian researchers who analyzed this period assessed the Middle East as an unstable region and made sure that Russia must remain in the region. Russian President Vladimir Putin stressed at the meeting of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation in the capital of Qatar Doha that the Russian presence will resume in the Middle East. In particular, he said: "The summit is an important event in the life of not only the Islamic world, but also the entire international community. Russia believes that the role of the OIC in shaping the architecture of the world order in the XXI century will steadily increase". Russia cooperates with Muslim countries actively both bilaterally and multilaterally. Our cooperation in ensuring international peace and security, sovereignty and territorial integrity of states, political settlement of conflicts, realization of the rights of religious and ethnic minorities, creation of an atmosphere of tolerance and dialogue of civilizations is of particular importance" [3].

On the other hand, Vladimir Putin's desire to become a member of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation as an observer in 2003 shows that Russia, where Muslims also live, seeks to strengthen its position in the Middle East. Russia became a member of the Organization of the Islamic Conference as an observer in 2005. According to Dmitry Trenin, director of the Carnegie research center in Moscow, one of the most authoritative sources of analytical information about Russia and the countries of the former Soviet Union, Russia's policy in the Middle East is as follows:

- 1) The deterrence and weakening of Islamic extremism and radicalism, the influence of which can spread to the territory of Russia and its closest neighbors.
- 2) The support of friendly forces and regimes in the Middle East region, the creation of long-term geopolitical alliances.

- 3) The ensuring a limited military presence of Russia in the region and on the borders of the region.
- 4) The expansion of Russia's presence in the regional markets of arms, nuclear fuel, oil and gas, food, etc.
- 5) The attracting investments to Russia, including a large amount of them from the rich countries of the Persian Gulf.
- 6) The maintaining energy prices by coordinating with key oil and gas suppliers in the Gulf countries [4].

In addition, the Russian Orthodox Church has problems with real estate in the Middle East. ROC was able to restore some of their rights in the region [5].

After the 2000s, Russia strengthened relations with the Middle East first through leaders and then through companies. These methods correspond to the above-mentioned goals. Some countries are examining this policy in the following way.

Jordan. Jordan is one of the important countries in the Middle East. The main reasons of the rapprochement Jordan with Moscow are as follows:

- the significant role of Jordan in the Palestinian-Israeli issue;
- the recent reaction to the recognition by the United States of America the Jerusalem as the capital of Israel;
- common thoughts with Russia about the civil war in Syria, which affected the region,
- the view on terrorism in the Middle East,
- the common prospects and position on Afghanistan,
- the trend in discussing the issue of Iraq.

Meetings of king Abdullah II of Jordan with Russian President Vladimir Putin are quite frequent. According to the website of the state presidency of the Russian Federation, 14 official meetings and several telephone conversations between the countries were held for the period 2008-2014 [6]. In 2006 Jordan transferred one hectare of land to the "Place of baptism of Jesus Christ" reserve, where the Russian pilgrimage center was opened in 2012. (Meeting with king Abdullah II of Jordan, 2013, Kremlin.ru) [7].

According to Ru-Stat, which engaged in the analysis of export and import data of the Russian Federation, the total volume of trade between the two countries in 2013-2018 amounted to 1.71 billion U.S dollars [8]. The data on export and import of the two countries for these years are as follows: Russia's export to Jordan in 2013 amounted to 170 million dollars USA, in 2014 - to 529 million dollars, in 2015 - to 241 million U.S dollars, in 2016 - to 156 million dollars, in 2017 - to 134 million dollars, and in 2018 - to 378 million U.S dollars.[Ru-Stat.com] [9].

Export of Jordan to Russia amounted in 2013 to 10 million dollars USA, in 2014 - to 13.7 million dollars, in 2015 - to 18.9 million dollars, in 2016 - to 17.8 million dollars, in 2017 - to 23 million dollars, in 2018 - to 13 million dollars [10]. Data from 2013-2018 indicated that the most important area of bilateral trade is plant products. Their worth was amount to \$ 593 million. The second most important direction is oil and oil products in value terms of 327 million dollars. According

to the indicators of Ru-Stat, the third part of 191 million dollars is the secret sector. No products are listed under this heading. There is a trade between the two countries in weapons technology. But the data in Ru-Stat is written under the heading '0 \$' [11].

The Jordan import from Russia has increased in 2014 in three times to 529 million dollars. The reason for the growth is the increase in the purchase of weapons by Jordan from Russia. On May 30, 2013, the Russian company "Basalt", which was opened exclusively in Jordan, began production of hand grenade launchers "Nashshab". In addition, RPG-32 grenade launchers are produced too. In February 2018 Russia allowed Jordan to export them to third countries. In 2018 Russian anti-aircraft missile and combat systems "Pantsir-S1" was sent to Jordan. It is known that in January 2018 Russia supplied universal helicopters Mi-26T2 to Jordan. Jordan earlier announced its readiness to purchase helicopters Mi-17, Ka-226T, Ka-32A11BC and civilian aircraft [12].

Jordanian-Russian relations in the energy sector are also developing. Russia's construction of a nuclear power plant in Jordan and the receipt of a tender for the construction of the first nuclear power plant in the fall of 2013 show us the direction of energy relations between the two countries. RusAtom Overseas and the Jordanian atomic energy Commission signed an agreement on the development of the project for the construction of the first nuclear power plant in Jordan. The agreement on cooperation on the construction and operation of a nuclear power plant was signed on March 24, 2015 in the territory of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. It entered into force on May 16, 2016. But Jordan had to stop building its large-capacity nuclear power plant, which cost \$ 10 billion dollars because of its expensiveness. The project on creation a nuclear power plant with lower capacity and lower cost was again implemented. RusAtom Overseas signed an agreement with the Jordanian atomic energy Commission on joint efforts to develop projects in the energy sector. In particular, the sides agreed to promote cooperation in the construction of small nuclear power plants [13]. Jordan is also planning to buy liquefied gas from Russia. Invitations to Russian researchers in Jordan for gas and oil research were issued [14].

Iran. Vladimir Putin met for the first time with Iranian President Seyid Mohammad Khatami in New York on 7 September 2000. 25 personal interviews and several telephone conversations were conducted between the leaders during the period 2000-2018. Contacts at the highest level increased in particular after 2012. It was conducted more than one meeting annually.

An important agreement was signed on 12 March 2001 that strengthened relations between the two countries. This agreement confirms cooperation in the economic, scientific, technical and energy spheres.

According to the export and import data of Russian Federation receiving from Ru-Stat, the volume of trade between the two countries for 2013-2018 amounted to 9.55 billion dollars USA [15].

Data on export and import of the two countries over the years

are as follows: Russian export to Iran amounted in 2013 to 1.17 billion U.S. dollars, in 2014 - to 1.29 billion U.S. dollars, in 2015 - to 1.02 billion U.S. dollars, in 2016 - to 1.76 billion U.S. dollars, in 2017 - _____ billion U.S. dollars, in 2018 - to 877 million U.S. dollars [16]. Iranian export to Russia amounted in 2013 to 428 million U.S. dollars, in 2014 - to 354 million dollars, in 2015 - to 268 million dollars, in 2016 - to 298 million dollars, in 2017 - to 392 million dollars, in 2018 - to 390 million dollars [17]. According to data for 2013-2018, the most important direction of bilateral trade is plant products in the amount of 3.721 billion U.S. dollars. The second most important direction is metal and metal products in value of 1.719 billion. The third direction is nuclear reactors, spare parts of reactors, mechanical devices, electric objects in value of 991 million dollars of the USA [18].

The Memorandum of understanding between the Water working group, the National gas company of Iran and PJSC Gazprom, the Agency for export credit and investment insurance (EXIAR) and the Iranian Bank, the chambers of Commerce of Iran and Russia has been signed.

The military agreements in the volume of bilateral trade are of a little importance. Another attempt to strengthen cooperation is the agreement between the Eurasian Economic Union and Iran, signed on May 17, 2018. It is estimated that the trade turnover between Iran and the countries of the Eurasian Economic Union which includes Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia is 2.7 billion US dollars per year [19].

It is worth highlighting a few points that are of critical importance. Agreement signed between the two countries in 2002-2005 was the basis of the Russian sales to Iran 33 multifunctional transport and military helicopters MI-171 and MI-171SH. The Iranian Air Force acquired 6 Su-25UBK attack aircraft in 2003-2006. Iran bought 3 helicopters Mi-17V-5 in 2005. For the protection of nuclear power plants against air strikes 29 systems TOR-M1 and spare parts to them were purchased in 2005, as well as 1200 missiles 9M331. The cost of this military deal was 1.4 billion U.S. dollars (us\$) [19]. The Russian defense Minister concluded military agreements during his visit to Tehran in 2015. It was decided to expand the entrance of Russian warships to the ports of Iran and expand the entrance of Iranian warships to Russian ports, which played a role in the similarity of views on the Middle East [20]. On the other hand, the deployment of the S-300 in Iran indicates that military cooperation between the two countries is crucial.

Important joint projects between Russia and Iran are being implemented in the energy sector. They are based on article 6 of the 2001 agreement referred above, which establishes the principles of cooperation in the energy sector. The article talks about the development of mutually beneficial relations between states aimed at the implementation of "joint projects in the field of transport, energy, including the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the construction of nuclear power plants, industry, science and technology, agriculture and health" [21]. The Russian side has helped Iran to complete the construction of a nuclear reactor at Bushehr and to provide political support to the government's position on the nuclear issue [22]. In addition, Russia intends to facilitate the sale of Iranian oil

to third countries.

In this regard, the sales representative Andrei Lugansky in an interview to the news portal "Izvestia" said that within the Russian-Iranian program "Oil in exchange for goods", Russia's goal is to sell Iranian oil to the markets of third countries. If this program is implemented, Iran is ready to buy engineering products on billions of dollars value from Russia, in particular technologies related to railways. In 2015, the Iranian Parliament approved \$ 5.5 billion Russian loan. This loan, which has not been taken, is now resuming its relevance. [23]. According to the news of the Russian portal "Nezavisimaya Gazeta", Iran is waiting for the promised Russian loan. The money will be allocated for projects related to energy, including nuclear and water transport, construction of dams and irrigation networks, construction of a network of railways and highways [24].

The United Arab Emirates is another country with an important geopolitical position in the Persian Gulf. It can be noted that both countries have similar views on the Syrian crisis, as well as cooperate in the field of military technology and energy. 13 personal meetings of the leaders of the countries have been held from 2007 till today.

According to the export and import data of the Russian Federation receiving from Ru-Stat, the volume of trade between the two countries in the period 2013-2018 amounted to 9.88 billion U.S. dollars [25]. The data on export and import of the two countries for these years are as follows: Russian export to the UAE amounted to 2.09 billion U.S. dollars in 2013, 1.74 billion U.S. dollars in 2014, 1.08 billion U.S. dollars in 2015, 965 billion U.S. dollars in 2016, 1.46 billion U.S. dollars in 2017, 1.1 billion U.S. dollars in 2018 [26]. The UAE export to Russia amounted in 2013 to 423 million U.S. dollars, in 2014 - to 264 million U.S. dollars, in 2015 - to 164 million U.S. dollars, in 2016 - to 271 million U.S. dollars, in 2017 - to 171 million U.S. dollars, in 2018 - to 151 million U.S. dollars [27]. According to data for 2013-2018, precious metals occupied a special place in the structure of trade turnover (4.171 billion us dollars). After 2013 the decline in import in this area led to a reduction in the volume of trade twice. The second most important area is the hidden section of 1.12 billion U.S. dollars value. It does not disclose what products are sold. Plant products are in third place with 891 million USD value [28].

The second important pillar of bilateral economic relations is the import of military technology by the United Arab Emirates from Russia. In August 2000, the UAE signed a contract with the Tula instrument design Bureau for the development and supply of anti-aircraft guns and missile systems "Pantsir-1". Russia and the UAE signed an agreement on military-technical cooperation in November 2006. The Russian company "Rosoboronexport" which produces a defensive weapon for the state is a frequent contributor on military and technological exhibitions in Saudi Arabia. Two agreements were signed with Russia at the 14th international exhibition IDW in 2019. Agreements were signed on the repair of artillery aircraft Pantsir-S1 in 12.5 million U.S. dollars value and anti-tank missiles with laser guidance in 40 million U.S. dollars worth.

Joint cooperation in the field of energy between the two countries is quite broad. The Russian company Rosneft is actively working in the region. On May 19, 2010, Rosneft signed a strategic partnership agreement with BAE Crescent Petroleum for the joint implementation of projects in the Middle East and North Africa. According to the agreement, Rosneft's share is 49% and Crescent Petroleum's share is 51%. Representatives of large companies such as LUKOIL Overseas and Stroytransgas are also in the country. In July 2008 Stroytransgaz and "Dolphin Energy" signed a contract at 418 million dollars value for the construction of the Taweelah-Fujairah gas pipeline in the United Arab Emirates. Transportation, operation, distribution and export of gas from the United Arab Emirates to Sharjah province are included in the plans for this period in accordance with the interests of Rosneft and Crescent Petroleum. There are also agreements on the supply of natural or enriched uranium for the Barak nuclear power plant.

Saudi Arabia. Relations between Russia and Saudi Arabia in the early 2000s were tested because of the situation in the North Caucasus. In March 2000, former Russian foreign Minister Ramadan Abdulatipov as Putin's special representative visited the Saudi capital and met with crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdulaziz. The Saudi side assured the Russian ambassador that Saudi Arabia respects the territorial integrity of Russia and the principles of non-interference in internal affairs. An agreement was also reached on the coordination of the actions of the Saudi organizations responsible for humanitarian assistance with the Russian authorities [29]. Saudi Arabia reacted negatively to the beginning of Russia's military actions in Syria, and expressed this dissatisfaction in the UN. In addition, Saudi Arabia is unhappy with the growing role of Iran, Russia's ally in Syria. Visits were made to Moscow in order to prevent cooperation with Iran in 2016 and 2017.

When considering relations between Russia and Saudi Arabia, it is also worth noting Riyadh's cooperation with Washington. Saudi Arabia and the United States have signed a deal for the supply of weapons at 109 billion US dollars worth.

According to the export and import data of the Russian Federation receiving from Ru-Stat, the volume of trade between the two countries in the period 2013-2018 amounted to 5.35 billion U.S dollars [30]. The data on export and import of the two countries for these years are as follows: Russia's export to Saudi Arabia amounted to 789 million dollars in 2013, 898 million dollars in 2014, 771 million dollars in 2015, 350 million dollars in 2016, 350 million dollars in 2016, 771 million dollars in 2017, 553 million dollars in 2018 [31]. The export of Saudi Arabia to Russia amounted in 2013 to 289 million U.S. dollars, in 2014 - to 267 million dollars, in 2015 - to 155 million U.S. dollars, in 2016 - to 141 million U.S. dollars, in 2017 - to 145 million U.S. dollars, in 2018 - to 219 million U.S. dollars [32]. According to data for 2013-2018, the most important direction of bilateral trade is plant products with 1.991 billion U.S dollars value. The second most important direction – plastic and rubber products (888 million U.S dollars), and the third - metal and metal products (785 million U.S dollars) [33].

Military cooperation between the countries is not developed. There is no serious volume of trade in military equipment until 2017. Even if Saudi Arabia has recently concluded military agreements with Russia, the strategic partnership with the United States makes relations with Moscow unclear.

Energy relations between the two countries are also quite interesting. On 26 January 2004, LUKOIL won a tender for the development of natural gas fields in Block A, located in the central part of the Rub Al-Khali desert. The contract for 40 years provides that the Russian company will become the operator of the project, as well as the creation of a joint venture with the state oil company Saudi Aramco. The company LUXAR (Lukoil Overseas – 80% and Saudi Aramco – 20%) was founded in 2007, designed to develop the Tuhman and Mushaib fields. In the same year the companies Stroytransgaz and Saudi Aramco signed a contract for the construction of the pipeline Shaybah-Abqaiq with a length of over 200 kilometers, estimated cost of which is 100 million dollars [34]. The formation of oil prices largely depends on policy of the USA in the new global system. In turn, OPEC is consulting with members on the regulation of oil prices. Although not a member of OPEC, Russia participates in discussions on oil price regulation, developing cooperation with the organization.

Egypt. 16 personal meetings of the countries' leaders have been implemented from 2000 to the present day. The role of the Israeli-Palestinian issue can be noted in the rapprochement between the two countries in the 2000s. According to Moscow, coordination with Egypt plays an important role in the settlement of the problem [35]. After the analysis the impact of the events of the Arab spring in Egypt, Moscow has not severed ties with Cairo. Two critical meetings were held in 2014. The first of them is the visit of deputy prime minister, minister of defense and military industry Abdel Fattah as-Sisi to Moscow on February 13, 2014 [36]. The second important meeting was with the President of Egypt on 12 August 2014. Egyptian president Abdel Fattah as-Sisi visited Russia for the second time.

The importance of this visit is that Russia is the first country outside the Arab countries visited by Sisi. According to the Kremlin, the goal of this visit was military cooperation, energy, economic relations and the Middle East [37]. Working groups were established in accordance with the interests of the two countries and were strengthened their diplomatic channels.

According to the export and import data of the Russian Federation providing by Ru-Stat, the volume of trade between the two countries in the period 2013-2018 amounted to 27.9 billion dollars [38]. The data on export and import of two countries for these years are as follows: Russia's export to Egypt amounted to 2.5 billion dollars in 2013, 4.94 billion dollars in 2014, 3.68 billion dollars in 2015, 3.72 billion dollars in 2016, 6.22 billion dollars in 2017, 4.13 billion dollars in 2018 [39]. The Egypt's export to Russia amounted in 2013 to 442 million dollars, in 2014 - to 540 million dollars, in 2015 - to 414 million dollars, in 2016 - to 361 million dollars, in 2017 - to 506 million dollars, in 2018 - to 452 million dollars [40]. According to the data for 2013-2018,

the most important direction of bilateral trade is products of plant origin (8.185 billion dollars worth). The second most important direction is the hidden section (5.614 billion us dollars). This title does not indicate which products are sold. The third category is metal and metal products (3.433 billion U.S dollars value) [41].

An important indicator in the development of economic relations is the implementation of a new project in the Suez Canal. The project provided for the simplification of the method of access to the Russian market and to the Russian industrial zone in Egypt. The agreement on the establishment of the Russian industrial zone was signed on February 2, 2016. The project provides for the creation of a special region with a simplified tax regime for Russian resident enterprises located in the East of Port Said. The project investment is estimated at about \$ 20 billion. The number of military agreements between two countries has recently increased. According to the project, which has been published in 2017, the two countries can use some military bases on equal rights. Egypt signed a series of agreements with Russian company Rosoboronexport in 2005-2008 for the supply of four anti-aircraft missile system TOR-M1, batch Buk-M1-2 anti-aircraft missile system, and anti-aircraft self-propelled unit Shilka ZSU-23-4. The sides also signed a contract for the supply of 14 helicopters Mi-1 to Egypt. The volume of contract amounted to \$ 150 million. Moscow and Cairo signed agreements in November 2013 on the purchase of 24 MiG-29M / M2 fighters, 12 Mi-35M attack helicopters, a mobile coastal missile system Bastion K300R, an anti-aircraft missile system Tor-2ME, firearms and ammunition more than \$ 3 billion value. Russia and Egypt signed a \$ 2 billion contract in May 2015 for purchase 46 MiG-29 fighter planes and six - eight aircrafts MiG-29M2 [42].

In addition to economic and diplomatic relations, energy relations between two countries are also developing. Company LUKOIL joined the WEEM oil project in 2001 in the Eastern desert and installed high-capacity power plants in the region. By joining the shale gas development and production project in the region in 2016, Rosneft is also strengthening its position in the region. Its share in the project is 30%. Company Gazprom signed a framework agreement on the supply of liquefied natural gas to Egypt for five years in August 2015 in cooperation with the Egyptian gas production company (Egyptian Gas Holding Company). The agreement was signed on August 5, 2015. Vladimir Putin paid a two-day official visit to Cairo on February 9-10, 2015 at the invitation of Sisi. After Vladimir Putin's visit to Cairo, Rosatom, the Egyptian society for the construction of nuclear power plants, the Egyptian and Eurasian economic society signed an agreement on the establishment of a free trade zone.

Turkey. Turkey is the one of the most important and critical countries in the Middle East. The foreign policy of the two countries is similar in many aspects. Sometimes Moscow and Ankara looked differently at the issues of the Caucasus, the Middle East, Crimea, Central Asia. Sometimes they are cooperated in these areas. Recently, bilateral relations have been developing in the economic, cultural and military spheres. According to the website of the Russian government, the leaders of the two countries have met 41 times since 2004.

According to export and import data of the Russian Federation providing by the Ru-Stat, the volume of trade between two countries in the period 2013-2018 amounted to 144.6 billion dollars [43]. Russian export to Turkey amounted to 7.27 billion in 2013, 24.9 billion in 2014, 19.3 billion in 2015, 13.4 billion in 2016, 18.4 billion in 2017, 16.3 billion in 2018 [44]. Turkey's export to Russia amounted to 7.27 billion in 2013 and to 6.64 billion dollars in 2014, in 2015 - to 4.06 billion dollars, in 2016 - to 2.12 billion dollars, in 2017 - to 3.39 billion dollars, in 2018 - to 3.02 billion dollars [45]. Based on the data of 2013-2018, it was estimates that the most important direction of bilateral trade is the secret section (\$ 42 billion value). Under this direction it is not specified what goods were bought and sold. The second direction is oil and oil products, gas (33 billion dollars value). Metal and metal products (\$25 billion value) are in third place [46]. One of the important elements of economic relations has been military technology. For ensuring the security Turkey initially wanted to buy an air defense system "Patriot" from the western allies. Due to the impossibility of buying "Patriot", Turkey has switched its attention to anti-aircraft sites of Russian production S-400. Ankara signed a contract with Moscow for the purchase of S-400 and made the first payment in rubles. Delivery of the S-400 was scheduled for June 2019. After it turned out that the USA will not supply the F-35 to Turkey, Su-35 and Su-57 Russian-made aircraft were also taken into account by Turkey.

Tourism is another important factor in the economic relations of the countries. There has been a significant increase in amount of tourists traveling from Russia to Turkey in recent years. 2019 was declared as the year of culture between the two countries. It is expected an even greater increase in the number of tourists from Russia to Turkey in this regard.

Russian-Turkish energy relations are becoming more active. The main examples of joint energy projects are the Akkuyu nuclear power plant and the Turkish stream. The power plant will be equipped with the latest reactors and will have a capacity of 4800 megawatts. Its service life is expected to be 60 years. Such joint projects as Blue stream, South stream and Turkish stream are discussed in detail within the framework of relations between Turkey and Russia. Russia will satisfy 53% of Turkey's gas needs through the Turkish stream.

II. CONCLUSION

This work provided Russia's and the Middle East's energy and trade prospects. On the basis of export and import data analysis and the essence of the energy agreements we came to the conclusion that relations between the Middle East and Russia after the recession of the 1990s are on the rise again. Despite crises with Chechnya, Ukraine and Georgia, Russia has recently strengthened its image with regard to "respect for territorial integrity in the Middle East and the fight against terrorism." It has taken important steps to restore relations with the Middle East, which have deteriorated since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Lost gains has been restored and raised to a higher level. The statements made in the UN and in the international organizations on non-interference in the affairs of the region and on the protection of territorial

integrity are the most important step in development close cooperation. It is reported at the same time that Moscow will stand against any armed group consisting in opposition to the regimes in the region. Energy investment in the strategic areas of the Eastern countries is another important step in expanding cooperation. Facilitating the payment of debts by Russia or the complete zeroing of debts we can regard as the first step to the entrance to the region. The provision of credit to the countries of the Middle East, which are in a critical situation, is the fourth important point. Russia's approach to the issue of cooperation with the Middle East is based on taking into account the needs of its Muslim population. Russia tries to convey to the citizens the differences between "Islam" and "radical Islam". Ideological gaps, which were formed as a result of the internal political struggle of the Middle East, can be filled by supporters of "radical Islam". One of the reasons for Russia's operations in the Middle East is to prevent ideological difference between "Islam" and "radical Islam". The role of such countries as Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq is important in this regard [47]. Russia's actions are aimed at weakening of extremism in these countries what will help to contain the waves of extremism among the Russian Muslim population

The emergence of a multipolar approach in the new world order in the region is beneficial for Russia. Russia often emphasizes the "protection of ties and civilizations". The policy of the United States in the Middle East has prompted the Middle East states to seek an alternative. Not only Turkey, but also Egypt, Iraq and Algeria are searching for an alternative. Countries such as the United Arab Emirates, Yemen and Jordan are also inclined to look for alternative allies.

Through the activities of such large Russian companies as Rosneft, Tatneft, Gazprom, LUKOIL, located in the Middle East, Moscow wants to strengthen its importance in the region. Russia is creating projects for the construction of nuclear power plants and plans to operate them over the years in countries such as Jordan (Qasr-Amra), Iran (Bushehr NPP), Egypt (El-Dabaa NPP), Turkey (Akkuyu NPP). The decline in oil prices caused by U.S policy has recently had an impact on important price categories in the Middle East. Riyadh and Moscow have agreed that they will not reduce oil prices. OPEC is another example of an exchange of views on oil prices with Russia. Another important issue that attracted our attention in the study is the Russian desire, together with its partners in the Middle East, to improve the production and export of shale gas to third countries, which is an additional source of energy for Russia. Working with countries such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Iran and Iraq, Russia wants to strengthen its position in the sector.

The USA is exerting psychological and economic pressure to reduce Russian sources of income in some countries in Europe and the Middle East, making Moscow's power more fragile in the region. Examples of this kind of pressure is the pressure on the Middle East countries associated with the purchase of Turkey S-400, Egypt's purchase of military aircraft from Russia, Jordan's acquisition of anti-aircraft missile and combat systems. The decrease and increase of the volume of trade between the two countries speaks about the advantages and

disadvantages of such pressure. One of the simplest examples of this is the cancellation of the Russian bid to expand oil reserves in West Qurna in 1997 after the war. However, for today, the results of Gazprom's active work in West Qurna are quite impressive. Two oil fields of LUKOIL participate in the tender for expansion, and drilling operations of Rosneft in the South of Iraq show that the balance in the field of energy began to change. The United States, which impose sanctions on Russia, are forcing Russia to gain positions in the region. After the sanctions imposed on Qatar, we believe that the visit of the Russian defense Minister to Qatar is a very good example.

The possibility of regime change, power change and popular uprisings in an unstable region is constantly being considered. The Russian authorities consider the consequences of the cancellation of major agreements, the cessation of the arms trade and the cessation of investment. The Russian authorities take the position of a moderator and consider the monitoring of developments optimal.

We must emphasize that Russia in the region is interested in providing a realistic policy. Investments in the economy and energy are the drivers of foreign policy. It should be noted that Russia is not the strangest player with the largest weight and influence in the region, but it would be appropriate to emphasize that Russia is now the actor that needs to be taken into account in the Middle East.

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